

Russell McIntosh

314 Philosophy Hall
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720

russ.mcintosh@berkeley.edu
<https://www.russellmcintosh.net/>
+1 (336) 662-3194

EDUCATION	Ph.D. in Philosophy, UC Berkeley Committee: Johann Frick and Jay Wallace (co-chairs), Jan Engelmann (Psychology) Dissertation: <i>How Others' Values Matter</i> We have reasons to advance the ends that others value. I argue that these are not entirely derivative of the reasons for others' values—including reasons to promote their welfare. In part, they arise from our <i>relationships</i> with others. Across three chapters, I develop the implications of this idea for the ethics of loving relationships, aggregation, and our treatment of animals. B.S. in Mathematics and Philosophy, UNC Chapel Hill with Highest Distinction	2020–27 (expected) 2014–18
AOS AOC	Moral and Social Philosophy (especially normative ethics, moral psychology, and animal ethics) Bioethics, Metaethics, Political Philosophy	
PAPERS	“Doing What Another Would Want” forthcoming in the <i>Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy</i>	
UNDER REVIEW	“Preference Coalitions and the Ethics of Aggregation” “A Puzzle About Moral Status”	
TALKS	“Preference Coalitions and the Ethics of Aggregation” (various titles) · Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, CU Boulder · Eastern APA, Baltimore · UC Berkeley Philosophy Forum · MANCEPT on Partial Aggregation (Manchester, UK) “The Separateness of Animals” · Duke Conference on Animal Welfare · Society for the Study of Ethics and Animals · UC Berkeley Philosophy Forum “Doing What Another Would Want” · Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, CU Boulder · British Society for Ethical Theory (Southampton, UK) · Joint Session of Aristotelian Society (Glasgow, UK) · Braga Meetings in Ethics (Braga, Portugal) · Berkeley-London Conference · Pacific APA, San Francisco · University of Mississippi Conference on Memorialization “Agent-Relative Prerogatives and Deference to Power” · Agency and Disadvantage Conference (Turku, Finland) “A Puzzle About Moral Status” · <i>Animal Liberation</i> 50th Anniversary Conference (Rennes, France) · Duke Animals and Equality Conference · Rice Graduate Animal Ethics Conference	 August 2026 January 2026 October 2025 September 2025 November 2026 (scheduled) August 2026 April 2026 August 2025 July 2025 July 2025 June 2025 May 2025 April 2025 March 2025 July 2025 June 2025 October 2024 April 2024

COMMENTS	On Sean Huang's "Conceptual Engineering as Practical Decision-Making" Berkeley-Stanford-Davis Conference, Stanford	May 2026
	On Bob Fischer's "Valuing Animals in Benefit-Cost Analysis" Rocky Mountain Ethics Congress, CU Boulder	August 2024
	On Tristram McPherson and David Plunkett's "Superintelligent AI and the Foundations of Ethics" Stanford Conference on Ancient and Contemporary Metaethics	February 2024
	On Dan Elbro's "Indirect Account of Moral Standing" Berkeley-London Conference (London, UK)	May 2022
AWARDS and FELLOWSHIPS	UC Berkeley	
	Fink Prize	2026
	\$1,000 departmental prize for best graduate student essay for "Preference Coalitions and the Ethics of Aggregation"	
	Dissertation Completion Fellowship	Fall 2025, Fall 2026
	\$16,000 stipend and coverage of tuition and fees	
	Outstanding GSI Award	2023
	awarded to fewer than 10% of GSIs	
	Summer Stipend Award (\$5,000 x3)	2021-23
	Ralph W. Church Fellowship	2020-21
	\$33,000 stipend and coverage of tuition and fees	
	UNC Chapel Hill	
	Worth Award for Excellence in Philosophy	April 2018
	Oldest academic award at UNC, given to one philosophy major each year	
SERVICE	Phi Beta Kappa	Fall 2017
	Writing Group Organizer	2026-27
	Prospective Visit Organizer	2025
	Colloquium Organizer	2023-24
	Philosophy Representative, UC Berkeley Graduate Assembly	2023-24
	Member, UC Berkeley Parking and Transportation Committee	2023-24
	Coffee Czar	2022-23
TEACHING	Colloquium Reception Organizer	2021-22
	As Primary Instructor	
	Introduction to Logic	Summer 2026
	Individual Morality and Social Justice (co-taught with Milan Mossé)	Summer 2024
	As Graduate Student Instructor	
	Bioethics, with Johann Frick	Spring 2026
	(with guest lecture on disability)	
	Political Philosophy, with Daniel Viehoff	Spring 2025
	(with guest lecture on felon disenfranchisement)	
	Philosophical Methods, with Shamik Dasgupta	Spring, Fall 2024
	Race, Ethnicity and Citizenship, with Tim Crockett	Fall 2023
	Introduction to Logic, with Erica Klempner	Summer 2023
	Individual Morality and Social Justice, with Jay Wallace	Spring 2023
	Individual Morality and Social Justice, with Johann Frick	Fall 2022
	(with guest lecture on free will)	
	Introduction to Logic, with Edward Schwartz	Summer 2022
	Moral Psychology, with Olivia Bailey	
	(with guest lecture on alienated emotions)	Spring 2022
	Nature of Mind, with John Campbell	Fall 2021

(with guest lecture on personal identity)

LANGUAGES

Native proficiency: English
Programming: Python, Java
Reading competence: German

GRADUATE COURSEWORK

Qualifying Exams

Animal Moral Psychology, with Jay Wallace	Spring 2023
Non-reductive Normative Realism, with Shamik Dasgupta	Spring 2023
Personal Identity and Ethics, with Johann Frick	Spring 2023

Credit

Dissertation Seminar, with John Campbell	Fall 2024, Spring 2025
Dissertation Seminar, with Hannah Ginsborg	Fall 2023, Spring 2024
Agency, Value, and the Moral Status of Animals, with Jay Wallace	Fall 2022
Philosophy of Science, with Shamik Dasgupta	Fall 2022
Aristotle's Moral Psychology, with Tim Clarke	Spring 2022
Individual, Ethical, and Social Choice, with Wes Holliday	Spring 2022
Ethical Theories, with Jay Wallace	Fall 2021
Population Ethics, with Johann Frick	Fall 2021
Hume, with Olivia Bailey	Spring 2021
Pragmatism, with Shamik Dasgupta	Spring 2021
First-year graduate seminar with John Campbell & Hannah Ginsborg	Fall 2020
Intermediate Logic, with Paolo Mancosu	Fall 2020
Descartes, with Alan Nelson	Fall 2017
Plato, with C.D.C. Reeve	Fall 2017
Philosophy of Science, with Marc Lange	Spring 2017
Philosophy of Mind, with Carla Merino-Rajme	Fall 2016
Beginnings of Analytic Philosophy, with M. Kotzen & A. Nelson	Spring 2016
Philosophy and Literature, with James Lesher	Spring 2016

Audit

Preferences, with Niko Kolodny	Fall 2026
Consent and Normative Powers, with N. Kolodny and V. Munoz-Dardé	Fall 2025
Philosophy of Language, with Seth Yalcin	Fall 2020

REFERENCES

Shamik Dasgupta
Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of California, Berkeley
shamikd@berkeley.edu

Johann Frick
Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of California, Berkeley
jfrick@berkeley.edu

Niko Kolodny
Professor of Philosophy
University of California, Berkeley
kolodny@berkeley.edu

Daniel Viehoff (teaching reference)
Associate Professor of Philosophy
University of California, Berkeley
dviehoff@berkeley.edu

R. Jay Wallace

William and Trudy Ausfahl Chair in Philosophy
University of California, Berkeley
rjw@berkeley.edu

How Others' Values Matter

Russell McIntosh

We have reasons to advance the ends that others value. In my dissertation, I argue that these are not entirely derivative of the reasons *for* others' values—including reasons to promote their welfare. In part, they arise from our *relationships* with others. Across three chapters, I develop the implications of this idea for the ethics of loving relationships, aggregation, and our treatment of animals.

Suppose that you have a special history with fig trees: you planted some with your parents as a child, you played under them, you make fig tarts every year, etc. Your friend decides to plant some herself, not because she especially loves the taste of figs, but merely because, she says, "I thought you would have wanted me to." Why should she do what you would want? In some cases, we have instrumental reasons to do what another would want: to swing the bat as your coach would want, or to feed your daughter as her doctor would want. But your friend is not merely using your wants as a heuristic tracking the independent value of fig trees. In my first chapter, I argue that your friend has a non-instrumental reason *grounded in your friendship* to value what you value. This explains why doing what another would want can be emotionally engaging and relationally significant: by valuing through another's eyes and acting on those values, we respond to and strengthen our loving relationships.

In my second chapter, I develop a novel approach to moral aggregation based on this idea that we have relationship-given reasons to advance what others value. Why can we sometimes justify burdening a person now with compensating benefits later, but not similarly justify burdening a person now with the same benefits to many others? On the traditional view, this is chalked up to the metaphysical separateness of persons. I propose a deeper explanation: we can compensate a person for a burden now with later benefits because she *cares* about her future self. But this explanation calls for revising the datum. Temporal biases can limit intrapersonal aggregation. And our altruistic concerns open avenues for interpersonal aggregation: we can sometimes balance a loss to a parent against a benefit to her child. Similarly, within the intergenerational practices like baseball, bluegrass, or philosophy that give meaning to our lives, concern for future generations of practitioners can license aggregation within that shared project. The resulting view draws moral boundaries not merely around separate persons, but around separate *preference coalitions*: persons, sets of people, or temporal stages of a single person with common patterns of concern.

I conclude the dissertation by applying this framework to animal ethics. On Nozick's famous suggestion, the right moral theory will be "utilitarianism for animals, deontology for people." On this now-popular view, people have rights that ordinarily preclude using them for the greater good, but animals lack these rights, such that we can draft them into biomedical research or a just war if the consequences are good enough. This view gets matters backward, for two reasons. First, people can waive their rights by consenting or forfeit them by doing wrong. But animals lack the relevant capacities for consent and responsibility, so any rights they have must remain in place. Second, people are often bound into preference coalitions with others. But animals generally have narrower evaluative horizons, and they lack the widespread concern for others that would license interanimal aggregation.

Despite the prevailing wisdom, the differences between people and other animals do not speak univocally in favor of stronger protections for people. I can console myself when I approach my death that my friends and family, and the institutions and practices I care about, will continue to flourish. But for a non-social animal like a moose, death is the end of nearly everything she cares about. In this important respect, the *separateness of animals* is a deeper divide than the *separateness of people*.